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Abstract. Communities that interact on-line through computer games and other 
virtual worlds are mediated by the audiovisual content of the game interface. 
Much of this content is subject to copyright law, which confers on the copyright 
owner the legal right to prevent certain unauthorized uses of the content. Such 
exclusive rights impose a limiting factor on the development of communities that 
are situated around the interface content, because the rights, privileges, and 
exceptions associated with copyright generally tend to disregard the cultural 
significance of copyrighted content. This limiting effect of copyright is well 
illustrated by examination of the copied content appropriated by virtual diaspora 
communities from the game Uru: Ages of Myst. Reconsideration of current 
copyright law would be required in order to accommodate the cohesion of on-line 
communities and related cultural uses of copyrighted content.  
1. Introduction 
Copyright law is intimately bound up with culture and community. The express purpose 
of copyright is to foster the development of art, music, literature, movies, and other 
cultural creations. Successful copyrighted works add to the fund of cultural content and 
practice, but generally do so through the mechanism of commodification. Ownership 
and sale of copyrighted content is intended to provide a monetary reward to spur 
cultural creation. Indeed, copyright holders frequently target their creative and 
distributive efforts toward cultural adoption, and profit from the promulgation of their 
works as part of popular culture.  
 Consequently, the copyright system has been criticized with increasing frequency 
for somewhat paradoxically failing to make allowances for access and re-interpretation 
of cultural materials (Lessig, 2004, Vaidhyanathan, 2004. Graphical, musical, 
audiovisual, and literary works constitute key components of shared culture. Full 
participation in society is impossible without access to such works, but access is 
controlled by an unsympathetic copyright regime. Some types of participation, such as 
criticism, commentary, and parody, are privileged under user privileges or exceptions, 
the American fair use doctrine. But many, indeed most, types of participatory re-
creation of copyrighted works are not contemplated within either fair use or other legal 
exemptions.  
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 This failure of the copyright system holds as true for participation in virtual 
communities as for society generally; indeed, given that virtual communities are largely 
mediated by copyrighted works, it poses a particular problem for such communities. In 
this paper I illuminate this problem by means of a case study, following the migration 
of copyrighted content away from the defunct on-line game Uru: Ages of Myst to 
Second Life to other venues. Graphics from the Uru game were reproduced on new 
servers by departing players attempting to maintain their distinctive virtual community 
and culture through shared iconic images. The unauthorized appropriation of content 
from the Uru game was crucial to maintenance of the virtual community but, as I show 
here, almost certainly constituted copyright infringement. 
2. The Uru Diaspora 
Digital communication technologies may be the object of existing culture, or may be 
the subject of new emergent culture. Virtual worlds are increasingly recognized as focal 
points for complex social interactions, leading to the development of distinct 
communities (Taylor, 2006). Such communities in turn give rise to the development of 
distinctive cultures (Boellstorff, 2008; Nardi, 2010). Among the more striking examples 
of on-line community and culture is that of the Uru diaspora, which has been studied in 
detail by Celia Pearce (2010). 
 Pearce describes the unique gaming community that formed around the virtual 
environment of the Uru: Ages Beyond Myst game, an on-line extension of the popular 
Myst and Riven computer games. The on-line game proved unprofitable and was shut 
down by the provider. Although not a financial success, the game attracted a highly 
devoted cadre of players, who, in the face of the game’s imminent closure, determined 
to retain and foster the community they had developed during their virtual association. 
In advance of the game closure, they identified and eventually colonized other virtual 
worlds where they could continue their community, importing with them into the 
alternative computer venues the distinctive design motifs of the architecture and 
artifacts from the Uru game interface.  
 As a result, a number of other on-line environments acquired regions of virtual 
territory, constructed by Uru migrants, that to a greater or lesser extent resembled the 
design of the Uru graphical interface. Uru look-alike images comprising buildings, 
fountains, and other distinctive architectural icons began to appear in the virtual worlds 
of Second Life, There.com, and elsewhere. For example, Figure 1 shows a distinctive 
fountain that was copied from the Uru game and reappeared in diaspora communities in 
Second Life and There.com. 
 In the interim, the Uru game itself has undergone a series of incarnations under a 
variety of proprietors. The game has reopened under a new sponsor on new servers, 
subsequently closed again, been hosted on player-maintained servers, and the game 
code has been promised to its users for maintenance as an open source project. 
Additionally, during this period, some of the venues to which the Uru diaspora 
migrated, such as There.com, have themselves encountered financial difficulty and 
closed their servers.  
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Figure 1. Uruvian Diaspora Fountain 
 This saga of the Uru diaspora makes for provocative social and cultural study, but 
it hinges to a large extent on the appropriation of intellectual property. The culture 
carried by migrants from the initial Uru game ultimately revolves around intellectual 
property, in the form of distinctive images and audiovisual works that they encountered 
on the initial server; their culture is in some sense owned by the developer of the game 
where the community first formed. The reproduction of images from the Uru game in 
Second Life, There.com and elsewhere implicates copyright in the original game. The 
original images – and despite the spatial façade of the game interface, at the end of the 
day, the virtual world “structures” are indeed images – were part of the Uru: Ages 
Beyond Myst game, both as the software of game and the audiovisual output of that 
software, and so subject to copyright by the developers of that game. The disappearance 
of the original game does not change the property status of the images; such intellectual 
property is transferable and devisable, and presumably passed via sale or bankruptcy to 
the new owners of the Uru game properties.  
3. The Copyright System 
Much of the creative material that constitutes computer games is subject to copyright 
law (Burk, 2006; Lastowka, 2010). Both individual components of the game and the 
overall combination of those components may constitute copyrightable works. 
Graphics, music, and sufficiently original sound effects all fall within copyrightable 
subject matter. The animated combination of sound and graphics constitutes a 
copyrightable audiovisual work.  The underlying software that records and controls the 
audiovisual output also falls within the ambit of copyright. The libraries of game 
components, as well as databases of character information that undergird virtual 
environments, may constitute sufficiently original compilations for copyright to attach 
to them as well (Burk, 2010a). 
 Copyright vests in the copyright holder the right to legally exclude others from 
engaging in certain activities vis a vis the protected work. In the United States, these 
activities include the unauthorized reproduction, distribution, adaptation, public 
performance, and public display of the work (17 U.S.C. § 103, 2006). Other 
jurisdictions grant similar exclusive rights. The exclusivity of the copyright holder does 
not extend to the idea instantiated in a protected work, but to the particular expression 
of that idea in the protected work. Infringement of the exclusive rights renders the 
perpetrator liable for monetary damages, and usually subjects the perpetrator to a court 
order enjoining further such activity.  
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 Thus, reproduction of the Uru images – indeed, conscious and wilful reproduction 
of the images – is rather clearly a violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive right of 
reproduction, the “copy right.” Some of the re-created images are literal copies of 
content from the Uru game, some are substantially similar or derivative of the content 
from the Uru game, and some have the “look and feel” of Uru content. And, liability 
for the infringement might not be limited to the subscribers who create potentially 
infringing images in the new server locales of the Uru diaspora. A credible argument 
could be made that the proprietors of Second Life and There.com are liable for 
contributory or vicarious infringement, “aiding and abetting” a copyright violation by 
hosting the images on their servers. As the operators of e-Bay, YouTube, various file-
sharing services, and some ISPs have discovered, simply providing a forum for 
copyright violation, without directly participating in the infringing activity, can 
sometimes create liability for infringement (Yen, 2006). 
 Of course, copyright liability attaches only to unauthorized uses of a work. One 
solution to the threat of liability is to seek permission or authorization for use of the 
work; but this is often not simple, practical or even feasible. An example related to this 
paper illustrates the point: the argument of this paper benefits from inclusion of an 
example of the kind of graphic material reproduced in the Uru diaspora, specifically the 
image of the iconic fountain that appears in Figure 1. Use of the image in a scholarly 
work is permissible under the copyright laws of many – although by no means all – 
countries. Any uncertainty as to the use of the image could be clarified by obtaining the 
permission of the copyright owner. But it is entirely unclear who one would even begin 
to approach to gain permission – the original image has been modified by largely 
anonymous players, and moved from server to server; control of the content has been 
transferred multiple times, and several of the entities that might own or control the 
content have gone into bankruptcy. The difficulty of determining whom one would 
approach to clear the rights for inclusion of an Uru diaspora image in a CaTaC paper 
indicates the similar difficulty that a user community would have in obtaining 
permission for their use of an iconic cultural image or motif. 
4. Failing Fair Use 
Like other property rights, copyright is not absolute, but is subject to a variety of 
privileges, exceptions, and exemptions that limit or curtail the exclusive rights of the 
copyright holder, often in particular contexts or situations (Burk, 2004). The copyright 
exemptions differ from nation to nation, but the majority of jurisdictions offer only a 
discrete list of limited uses, such as news reporting, educational use, or private use, that 
qualify as legally permissible without authorization of the copyright holder. Such uses 
are typically narrow and specific and unlikely to apply to cultural appropriations such 
as those considered here, or for that matter to other takings for purposes of cultural or 
communal meaning. 
 Virtual community poses a particular challenge for the application of such 
exemptions. Certain copyright exemptions might accommodate cultural uses of tangible 
objects, but often the fit of the exemptions to digital objects is poor. For example, most 
countries include in their copyright law some form of “first sale” doctrine that exhausts 
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the control of the copyright holder over a particular copy after it has been lawfully 
transferred (17 U.S.C. § 109, 2006). The owner of a copy thus has the right to gift, 
resell, or even publicly display that particular copy of the work. But this right extends 
only to the transfer of a particular copy, and not to the generation of additional copies. 
Digitized materials are peculiar in that transfer of bits is affected by the generation of 
new copies – in RAM, on magnetic media, and elsewhere over multiple networked 
machines. Thus, it is unclear how or whether first sale might apply to the transfer of bits 
(Lemley, 1997). The first sale doctrine may accommodate the distribution or display of 
tangible cultural items, but not the digital cultural items on which virtual communities 
rely. 
 In the United States, the best known of the copyright user privileges or exemptions 
is likely the statutory fair use provision, which allows context specific uses of the 
protected work without authorization of the copyright owner (17. U.S.C. § 107, 2006). 
The applicability of fair use is highly flexible, rather than constrained in the manner of 
most copyright exemptions. Often the first instinct when an unauthorized use seems 
compelling is to rely on the “fair use” provision to justify the use, as for example in the 
case of unauthorized cultural appropriation of copyrighted works (Tushnet, 2007). 
However, the fair use provisions were not necessarily intended to accommodate such 
takings, and have not necessarily been interpreted in a manner that would justify them.  
 The U.S. copyright statute indicates four factors that are to be weighed in deciding 
whether a given use is fair: first, the purpose for which the material is being taken; 
second, the type of work from which the material is taken; third, the extent of the 
material taken; and fourth, the impact of the taking on the market for the work from 
which the material is taken. Courts have at times given extra weight to the final factor. 
The Supreme Court has also suggested that fair use is one of the statutory features 
necessary to mediate between the constitutional demands of free speech and the 
exclusive rights to expression granted by copyright: although copyright constitutes a 
governmental constraint on speech, fair use provides a measure of activity free from the 
constraint (Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 1985). Consequently, uses of 
copyrighted material for purposes of public discourse, such as criticism, commentary, 
and parody, are given particular preference when considering whether the use is fair. 
 Depending on the factual context of these criteria, it may be permissible to use 
some, all, or none of a copyrighted work in a given situation without authorization. The 
determination of fair use has both the virtue and the vice of being highly fact-specific. 
Such context specificity makes the provisions highly plastic, adaptable to a wide range 
of situations, including new and unforeseen situations; but at the same time, because the 
outcome varies with the context, the application of the provisions is often 
unpredictable. But however flexible it may be, fair use is like a rubber band: you can 
only stretch it so far before it snaps. Whether or not a use will be judged fair in a given 
situation is frequently a matter of some doubt until a court renders a verdict on the 
question. But certainly maintaining the cultural integrity of a virtual diaspora is not a 
use that courts would immediately recognize as fair.  
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4.1. PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF THE USE 
In assessing the first factor, courts will tend to ask whether the unauthorized use is 
“transformative,” that is, whether the appropriated material is the basis for a new or 
altered work (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 1994). The transformativity test 
essentially constitutes an inquiry into whether the unauthorized use is a socially 
valuable use, at least in the dimension of originality. Uses that produce new works are 
favored; presumably if the goal of the use is simply to re-cycle or re-use the existing 
work, society is gaining little, and the courts assume that the appropriator could just as 
well seek the owner’s permission.  
 It is unclear how often the use of cultural icons, in a situation such as the Uru 
diaspora, will fit the transformativity test, as the test makes assumptions about 
unauthorized uses that are orthogonal to cultural or community uses. In some cases an 
image or motif will be incorporated into a new design or graphic representation, but just 
as often it will reproduce the initial image from which it was drawn. Indeed the 
diaspora uses may be intended to reproduce the previous image as faithfully as possible. 
Novelty is not at all the point of such takings, but fidelity. The goal in appropriation of 
a cultural icon is frequently not to transform it into something new, but rather to 
preserve its existing social meaning, even in a new context. 
4.2. NATURE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK 
Neither is the second fair use factor likely to favor diaspora uses. Certain types of 
works receive “thin” or minimal copyright protection if the expressive content is sparse, 
and the majority of the content is unprotectable under copyright. For example, the 
copyright protection for factual compilations is typically “thin,” as the facts themselves 
cannot be protected by copyright, but only their original selection and arrangement. 
Unauthorized use of minimally expressive works is more likely to be fair, as there is 
less protectable expression. More creative, expressive works receive more robust 
copyright protection, and so are reciprocally less amenable to fair uses.  
 The images taken in the Uru situation are not factual or minimally expressive; 
quite the contrary, they are likely to be creative and original in the sense of copyright 
law – that is, they originate with their authors. The images are not factual; they do not 
depict or collect indicia about the state of the world (Durham, 2001). They are largely 
the product of the originator’s imagination. Consequently, they are likely to receive full 
copyright protection, militating against a determination of fair use. 
4.3. AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY USED 
Assessing the weight of the portion taken from the copyrighted work presents a 
problem in defining the work in question. As indicated above, an audiovisual work like 
a computer game comprises a constellation of individual copyrighted works, as well as 
constituting a copyrighted work in total. Thus, it is difficult to assess what the work at 
issue may be for purposes of fair use; the appropriation may be fractional or total, 
depending on the quantum chosen for analysis. For the most part, players in the Uru 
diaspora did not take the entire audiovisual work – although eventually they ran the full 
game on private servers, this was done with the acquiescence, and perhaps the formal 
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permission, of the game publisher. Rather, players tended to appropriate particular 
images from the game for replication in other virtual worlds. One might argue that the 
relevant work is the game as a whole, and lifting a discrete image out of the entire game 
constitutes a minimal taking. On the other hand, the image itself may be considered a 
copyrighted work, and taking that image could constitute taking that work in its 
entirety. 
 Courts have also taken into account the qualitative dimension, rather than the 
quantitative dimension, of unauthorized takings for fair use. This type of scrutiny 
recognizes that different portions of a work have different degrees of significance, 
regardless of the amount of material. Even if the quantum of material taken from the 
copyrighted work is small, it may be that the material taken constitutes the “heart” or 
essential aspect of the work (Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 1985). Unauthorized 
taking of essential material may be more intrusive on the rights of the copyright holder 
than would be a more extensive unauthorized taking of nonessential material. In such 
cases, even a relatively small taking may disfavor fair use. 
 Here again, when considering the qualitative aspects of this fair use factor in the 
Uru diaspora, the analysis may turn on the definition of the work under consideration. 
If the work at issue is the Uru game as a whole, then the copying of certain culturally 
evocative images or motifs hardly seems to go to the heart of the work. Certainly the 
players who were relocating to new servers were consciously trying to reproduce the 
“essence” of the game they had left, but this is probably not the kind of core feature that 
the fair use test is intended to assay; it is looking rather for the unauthorized taking of 
some feature that gives the copyrighted work its value. The images of buildings or 
architectural motifs that migrated with the Uru diaspora are probably not core features 
of the Uru game in this sense. 
 However, the analysis likely changes if the focus moves from the audiovisual 
work of the game to the individual components of the game, which constitute 
copyrightable works in their own right. If the works at issue are the particular images 
that comprise the visual features of the game, not only does the scale of the fair use 
comparison change, but perhaps also the level of significance for a given taking. A 
particular motif from an Uru image, copied to Second Life or elsewhere, might well 
constitute the “heart” or gist of that particular image, even if it were not the “heart” of 
the game as a whole. 
4.4. EFFECT ON THE MARKET 
The final statutory factor in the fair use analysis is the impact of the unauthorized taking 
on the market for the copyrighted work. Here again, the definition of the work at issue 
is critical, as is the definition of the market. Courts have in some cases tended -- 
somewhat tautologically -- to define the market in question for this factor as the market 
for licensing the portion taken (American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 1994). 
And, of course, it follows from this definition that an unauthorized taking of material 
necessarily displaces sales in the market for licensing of that particular material, making 
damage to the market something of a foregone conclusion. This seemingly inevitable 
outcome is somewhat ameliorated by consideration of whether a mechanism exists to 
facilitate licensing in such a market – whether there exists a clearing house or 
intermediary or set of commercial practices that would allow potential licensees to find 
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and negotiate with the copyright holder (Princeton University Press v. Michigan 
Document Services, Inc., 1996). 
 On the one hand, it might be argued that the appropriation of content from the Uru 
game is likely to have minimal impact on the market for the game. In the diaspora, there 
seems to be no market for the game; players appropriated the images because the 
market failed. Players would clearly have preferred to continue playing the original 
game were it available; images from the game were transferred to other venues only 
because the original was unavailable. No real mechanism is apparent by which former 
players could instead have licensed the game or its contents. 
 At the same time, one can imagine scenarios in which the migration of the Uru 
content could be said to damage the actual or potential market for subscriptions to the 
game. As described above, ownership and control of the game passed through several 
different hands, with repeated attempts to re-launch the authorized version of the game. 
This is not particularly unusual; game providers come and go; they sometimes 
experience bankruptcies, and the assets of the company, including its content may well 
be acquired by a new owner. When a new owner attempts to re-launch a defunct game, 
or to attract players to refurbished content, the presence of copied alternates in other 
venues might prove a deterrent to success of the re-launch. Removal of copied content 
from Second Life or similar diaspora sites, perhaps under threat of legal liability, might 
encourage former players to return to the authorized version of the game if it becomes 
available once more. 
5. Conclusion 
In the actual Uru diaspora, the game publisher who holds the copyright to the 
appropriated content has been surprisingly indifferent to the unauthorized uses by 
former players (Pearce, 2010). But it need not have been, and other copyright owners in 
other situations likely would not be, as has been demonstrated in the case of on-line 
appropriation of copyrighted film and broadcast media content by fan communities 
(Consalvo, 2003). Additionally, the Terms of Service for most virtual worlds forbids 
infringing activity; to the extent that the unauthorized uses of Uru graphics in Second 
Life and other diaspora communities constitute infringement, the Uru migrants could be 
barred from their new places of residence for ToS violations (Burk, 2010b). 
 The analysis offered here suggests that even the most flexible exception to 
copyright, the American fair use provisions, offers little hope of validation for 
unauthorized cultural uses of virtual world materials. Thus, adoption of iconic graphic 
elements by on-line gaming communities presents something of a “Catch-22” situation. 
To the extent that the success of multiplayer games depends upon social networking, 
that network is necessarily built upon the sounds, graphics, and software that constitute 
the game, all of which are the subject of copyright. Yet this detailed analysis of the 
disposition of cultural icons in the Uru diaspora demonstrates the antipathy of copyright 
law to such unauthorized uses of material found in MMORPGs and similar virtual 
environments. The use of the iconic components of the game by the communities that 
are built upon those elements is restricted under the current copyright regime. 
Commentators have argued in favor of recognition of such communal and cultural uses 
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of copyrighted works (Chander and Sunder 2007) but the legal system has yet to adopt 
such arguments. 
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